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Abstract
E. Parker Lowe is a 2004 graduate of the University of Oklahoma College of Law and a 20032004 member of the Oklahoma Journal of Law and Technology. Below, Mr. Lowe analyzes the
Fourth Amendment implications of electronic mail (email).
Mr. Lowe argues that the principle that the Fourth Amendment protects people and not mere
places leads to the conclusion that there is some amount of Fourth Amendment protection
applicable to the contents of private emails. Part II of this note provides an overview of Internet
technology to provide a framework for analysis. Part III discusses the susceptibility of email to
interception which could undermine its protection as private under traditional Fourth
Amendment analysis. Part IV includes a discussion of major Fourth Amendment cases and
analogies that can be drawn therefrom to the email context. Part V poses the question of whether
or not the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 can serve as a basis for a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Mr. Lowe concludes by arguing for the announcement of a rule that sets
definite standards for the protection of email users’ privacy.
Edited by Jennifer Stevenson
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“The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of espionage
is not likely to stop...Ways may some day be developed by which the
Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them
in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate
occurrences of the home.” 1
- Olmstead v. U.S., Justice Brandeis (dissenting) I.

Introduction

The Internet is the phenomenon of our times. It is both a blessing and a curse. It allows
us to do so many things in an instant with just the touch of a button, yet it also presents many
societal problems. The Internet has revolutionized business and personal communication. 2 Not
only are the uses of the Internet incredible, so is its growth. It has been estimated that more than
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one billion users will connect to the Internet by the end of 2005. 3 As the Internet continues to
expand and becomes an entire branch of society, we must be wary of the many concerns that
come along with its use. One must understand the risks of sending and receiving communication
via the Internet and how much privacy, if any, is afforded to it in light of the U.S. Constitution.
As different technologies emerge, society must decide how much privacy will be given to these
new forms of communication. One form of communication that society must learn how to deal
with is the one-to-one messaging form known as electronic mail or “email.” This note addresses
an alarming phenomenon: many email users expect privacy in their messages, but the U.S.
Constitution does not seem to reflect this expectation.

Federal statutes have been passed

recently, such as the U.S.A. Patriot Act, 4 which shows a trend of Americans’ privacy shrinking.
Thankfully, there is a bottom line of privacy protection that cannot be stripped: the Fourth
Amendment.

However, according to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, traditional privacy

protections may not apply to email. If the Fourth Amendment does not protect email, then the
only national protection that is afforded to email is through federal statutes passed by Congress,
which will only further diminish if the trend continues.
Because there are many similarities between email and letters, it can be argued that email
should receive the same privacy protection as first class mail. There is a reasonable expectation
of privacy in first class mail as annunciated by the Court in United States v. Jacobsen. 5
However, the question presented here is whether an email and a first class letter are so similar as
to receive the same protection. Both email and letters are written forms of communication,
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usually from one person to another, which can be copied and stored for long periods of time. 6
Email and first class mail allow users to send large amounts of information, including
attachments, for a relatively low cost. 7 Moreover, both provide an easy medium for solicited and
unsolicited advertisements to specific addresses and persons.

However, because of the

technology email uses, first class mail and email differ much in their operation. If a first class
piece of mail went through the same process as an email does in order to reach its destination, it
might look something like this: the sender would drop a first class letter in a mail box; then a
postman would shred the letter and take the pieces to the post office for sorting; next, the
different pieces of the letter would be sent in separate trucks, possibly through different cities,
until they all reached the same destination; upon arrival at its destination, the shredded letter
would then piece itself back together in its original form. The destination is not in the recipient’s
mailbox, as it is with a normal first class letter, but it arrives at a centralized location where the
recipient picks up the mail. Furthermore, this process is complete in a matter of seconds.
Therefore, this process demonstrates that comparing email to first class mail is not very straight
forward.
II.

An Internet Overview

Before one can understand the privacy implications email presents, a basic history and
understanding of the Internet is appropriate. The Internet is not a physical place, but rather a
global interconnected network of computers and hardware, which allows the transmission and
reception of information and communication. 8 A network is simply a group of computers linked

6

Id. at 182-83.
Id.
8
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
7

3

together that are able to communicate between each other. 9 From its origins as an experimental
project in 1969 by the U.S. Department of Defense, the Internet has allowed the transmission of
communications almost instantaneously. 10

Originally, the Internet, then known as the

ARPANET, connected defense contractors, the military and certain universities in order to
establish a form of communication in case of nuclear war. 11 In 1983, the ARPANET was
divided into two different systems, one system for the military known as MILNET, and the other
system devoted to more research of networking, known as the DARPA Internet. 12

The

networking system, DARPA Internet soon became the phenomenon of what is known today
simply as the Internet. 13 The Internet now consists of millions of networks, routers, and devices,
which send and receive electronic information between each other. 14 The hardware that makes
up the Internet is owned and operated by various government institutions, private organizations,
businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and private citizens. 15 Similar to its early years as an
experiment, the Internet’s main use is communication. Roughly six common categories of
Internet communication exist:
(1) one-to-one messaging,
(2) one-to-many messaging,
(3) distributed message databases,
(4) real time communication,
(5) real time remote computer utilization, and
(6) remote information retrieval. 16
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One-to-one messaging on the internet consists of electronic mail, or email. 17 When one
sends an email, it is impossible to determine the path that message will take to reach the
recipient. 18 In fact, an email sent to one person might not take the same path as a different email
sent seconds later to the very same person. 19 To complicate things more, the Internet uses an
operation known as “packet switching” where an individual message is divided up into smaller
chunks known as “packets.” 20

Once the email is divided into these packets, it is sent

independently through the Internet and later reassembled at its destination. 21 Since the Internet
was designed for efficiency of communication during a nuclear war, these packets do not always
travel through the same channels, but instead are routed through different networks when it is
more efficient. 22 Once an email arrives at its destination, it is not located at the recipient’s
computer but at the user’s email service provider.23

The email will remain on the email

provider’s system until the recipient retrieves the message. 24

Once the intended recipient

receives the email, the message will usually be downloaded to his hard drive and erased from the
email provider’s host computer, but this is not always the case. 25 Pursuant to company policies,
email providers do not erase the message for a certain period. 26 Finally, other email providers
store all of the user’s email on its server until deleted by the user. With these types of email
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providers, a user’s email is never automatically downloaded to his hard drive, unless he takes
independent action.
III.

Email Susceptibility

Such a complicated protocol results in the little chunks of one email traveling through an
indeterminate amount of systems and networks before reaching the intended recipient. 27 Each
time an email travels through a different network, it risks interception by unwanted eyes. 28 As
the email travels through cyberspace it is subjected to several million Internet users with the
ability and knowledge to intercept that message at numerous points. 29 All Internet traffic that
flows to and from a user’s computer passes through that user’s Internet Service Provider (“ISP”),
making this point one of the easiest places to intercept an email or Internet traffic. 30 This is the
reason the FBI targets this point in order to implement its Carnivore surveillance technology
(which will be discussed further). 31 Many ISPs provide users with email service also, but if one
uses an independent email provider, then another point of interception exists: the independent
email provider’s network. 32 Hackers or renegade employees of the email service can intercept
email just as easily when the messages pass through the independent email provider’s server as
they can when the messages pass through an ISP’s server. 33 If a person sends an email from his
office computer, the email travels through the corporate network, which makes the message
susceptible to interception by co-workers and network administrators. 34 When a person uses a
broadband technology such as a cable modem, a shared local loop is used, meaning all
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neighborhood Internet traffic shares the same physical wires. 35 With certain bits of hardware
and some know-how a hacker can easily intercept an email on its way out of the sender’s
neighborhood. 36 Finally, as wireless networks become prevalent users should be aware that
email traffic is susceptible to interception at the base station for the antenna, which is the point
where the email is converted to wire network signals. 37 These examples are by no means the
only places email can be compromised and are not even an exhaustive list of the most susceptible
places for an email.
Today, renegade hackers are not the only threat to the privacy of email. The federal
government also uses at least one hacker technology to intercept email known as a “packet
sniffer.” 38 Packet sniffers are programs that look at all the information, or packets, that pass over
the network to which they are connected. 39 The FBI is currently using its third generation
of online detection systems known as the DragonWare Suite, which allows the FBI to
reconstruct emails, downloaded files and web pages. 40 The infamous Carnivore is a part of
DragonWare Suite that gathers all information on a network, essentially making it a packet
sniffer. 41 With millions of hackers on the Internet and so many points of vulnerability for
electronic mail, why should anyone reasonably expect their email to remain private? And if
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy and emails are being seen by unwanted eyes
already, why should the government be barred from reading your email also?
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IV.

Constitutional Protection?

The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” 42 A search or seizure
can only occur if a legitimate expectation of privacy exists.43 Therefore, this section will address
whether it is objectively reasonable for a person who sends or receives an email via the Internet
to legitimately expect the message to remain private. Many standards of protection might be
applied to email, but it is unclear as to which one should be applied. It is important to look to
applicable Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to determine if the present case law can logically be
applied or if another standard needs to be crafted for this ever changing technology.
A.

Katz v. United States
1.

Facts

In Katz v. United States, 44 the petitioner was charged and convicted of transmitting
wagering information by telephone in violation of a federal statute. 45

Without judicial

authorization, FBI agents attached an electronic device outside of a public telephone booth,
which allowed the agents to listen and record the calls the petitioner made inside the phone
booth. 46 The evidence obtained through the electronic device was used at trial to convict the
petitioner. 47 The petitioner claimed that the evidence had been obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, but the court of appeals affirmed the conviction and rejected the claim since
there had been no physical intrusion of the telephone booth. 48 The Supreme Court then granted
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certiorari to consider whether the petitioner had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his
telephone conversation which took place inside a closed phone booth. 49
2.

Majority Opinion

The Supreme Court had previously relied on the “trespass” doctrine of Olmstead v.
United States 50 and Goldman v. United States, 51 which said a search and seizure could not occur
unless a physical trespass had taken place, but the Court overturned this narrow policy holding
that people, and not merely areas, are protected by the Fourth Amendment. 52 Accordingly, the
Court said the fact the electronic device used was not inside the phone booth was not significant
to the constitutional inquiry. 53 The Court concluded because the petitioner justifiably relied
upon the phone booth to be private, by electronically listening and recording the petitioner’s
words, the Government had performed a search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. Consequently Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment privacy interest had been violated. 54
3.

Concurring Opinion

Justice Harlan’s famous articulation of the present day test for whether if a Fourth
Amendment search has occurred set forth a two-fold inquiry: (a) has the person exhibited an
actual, or a subjective expectation of privacy and (b) is that expectation one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable? 55 In the case at bar, the exhibition of an actual expectation
was seen by the petitioner occupying the phone booth, closing the door, and paying the toll.56
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Justice Harlan then said, as the Court found in Rios v. United States, 57 society has recognized the
expectation of privacy of a phone booth as reasonable. 58
4.

Katz’s Analysis of Email

The Court in Katz could not have foreseen this test might be applied to modern privacy
concerns with email. Very few courts have decided how much protection an email deserves, and
none have specifically decided what privacy rights exist for email in transit. However, courts
have reasoned that Fourth Amendment protection diminishes when sending mail or other
information by a computer. 59 But the extent of the diminution is unclear. Therefore, it is helpful
first to apply the two part test of Katz. To meet the first prong of Katz, the existence of a
subjective expectation, one can argue that by using electronic mail to communicate in the first
place, the user exhibits an expectation that the message will remain private because most email
users do not know how susceptible email is to interception. Courts may find this is enough for
the subjective prong, especially today because email is such a new form of communication and is
not understood very well. This argument is strengthened when a person takes extra steps to
ensure privacy in his email by using an email provider that requires a username and password to
send and receive messages, or using encryption technology to encode messages as it travels over
the Internet. Courts might also find a subjective expectation for one-to-one email messaging
simply because it is directed and addressed to only one party. However, if that same email is
sent to other recipients, forwarded, or the sender uses a more open method of sending the
message via the Internet (such as a public chat room), a court will likely see this as voluntarily
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exposing the message to a third party, thus eliminating the expectation of privacy. 60 The second
element of Katz, whether there is an objectively reasonable expectation in an email, will likely
depend on many factors such as the type of Internet communication that is used, the recipient of
the message, and the relationship between the user and email provider. 61 The Sixth Circuit has
held that users of a computer bulletin board do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy
because this is a public posting of information. 62 The court in United States. v. Maxwell 63 held
that there is no reasonable expectation in emails sent to chat rooms with several members. 64
Courts have also held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in email conversations
made in a private, one-on-one chat room. 65 Further, if an employee uses his employer’s email
system, then the expectation of privacy decreases and might not exist at all no matter what form
of electronic communication is used. In United States v. Monroe, 66 the court held that a member
of the U.S. Air Force had no legitimate expectation of privacy in his email messages when
government personnel were responsible for maintaining the system which might require
monitoring email. In Monroe, the court considered other factors such as the email host system
used to send and receive emails was owned by the government, and all users were warned of
possible monitoring by government employees once logged in to their email accounts. 67 The
court in Smyth v. Pillsbury Co. 68 affirmed an employee being fired for comments made over the
company’s email network in holding there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in email if
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the message was sent to a supervisor voluntarily, despite assurance by the company that all email
would remain private and would not be used as grounds for termination.69 The court in McLaren
v. Microsoft Corp. 70 held there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in email when the
messages are sent and received over the employer’s email system and are stored on the
employee’s office computer. 71 The McLaren court reasoned that a computer is provided not for
storage of personal property, but rather for work functions, and that the email stored on the
employer’s computer is “merely an inherent part of the office environment.” 72 Therefore, it
seems courts will only find a reasonable expectation of privacy in email in very fact-specific
circumstances, if any at all. A reasonable expectation of privacy might exist if a person sends an
email message to one recipient using a home computer that is connected to a network that does
not monitor email, and the message is not sent to any other party other than the intended original
recipient. One must consider whether, if federal statutes that give some protection to electronic
communications, such as the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”), were not in
place, the Fourth Amendment would extend to protect email from the government’s eyes at all.
Therefore, it is helpful to look to more recent Supreme Court cases to determine the
Constitutional protection of email.
B.

California v. Greenwood 73
1.

Facts

Without a warrant, on April 6, 1984, in connection with an investigation of possible
narcotics trafficking, an investigator of the Laguna Beach Police Department asked the
neighborhood trash collector to pick up the plastic garbage that had been left by the respondent
69
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on the curb in front of his house. 74 The trash collector complied and the officer searched through
the trash and found evidence of narcotics use. 75 The officer then obtained a warrant to search the
respondent’s home as a result of the evidence found in the trash bags. After finding more
incriminating evidence at the respondent’s home, the respondent was arrested on federal
narcotics charges. 76 After posting bond, police officers suspected continued drug trafficking, so
they intercepted the respondent’s garbage bags again from the neighborhood trash collector
without judicial authorization. 77 The second search of the respondent’s trash bags resulted in
another search warrant for his house, which produced even more evidence of narcotics
trafficking, led to the respondent’s second arrest. 78 The superior court held that warrantless
“trash searches violate the Fourth Amendment and the California Constitution.” 79
The California appellate court affirmed the decision. 80 The U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine whether warrantless searches and seizures of garbage bags left on the curb
outside of a house violated the Fourth Amendment.
2.

Majority Opinion

The Court applied the Katz two-prong test to determine if there was search of the garbage
bags for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 81 The Court found the respondent might have
exhibited an expectation of privacy by placing the trash in an opaque bag for a limited time on
the curb; however, society must accept this expectation as objectively reasonable for the
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expectation to exist. 82 The Court found that society did not exhibit such an expectation. 83 It
reasoned that because the garbage bags were exposed to the public and were readily accessible to
animals, children, snoops, and others within the general public, Fourth Amendment protection
did not protect the bags. 84 Further, police should not be expected to turn away from evidence of
criminal activity that could have been observed by any member of the public. 85
3.

Email and Greenwood

After seeing the alarming number of hackers, the numerous points of weakness in emails,
and the technologies used to aid in hacking, it is possible that use of the Internet to communicate
can result in exposure of email messages to the general public. Because the Court held that
exposing property to the public results in a lose of Fourth Amendment protection,86 courts may
find sending electronic mail via the Internet analogous to placing garbage bags in front of the
home, thus a reasonable expectation of privacy as to emails will not exist.
If any Internet user types ‘how to hack’ or ‘packet sniffer’ on a search engine, thousands
of links will come up ready to sell any Internet user email surveillance technology.

The

Greenwood Court would likely find that children, snoops, and others within the general public
could easily seize another’s email with no more effort than taking someone’s garbage bag and
rummaging through the contents. Therefore, treating email in cyberspace as garbage bags on the
curb is not as far fetched as it might sound. However, the Court in Greenwood never defined
what constitutes the “public.” Even if it had, the definition of “public” for garbage bags might
be different than the definition of “public” for the electronic mail. The “public” for email
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purposes could be the American population, the world population, the American Internet
population, or the world Internet population. This determination could have an affect on Fourth
Amendment protection of email. If “public” is defined as the American Internet population or
the world Internet population, then it will be more likely that sending an email means exposing
the message to the public because, as discussed above, most Internet users can download
software to intercept email fairly easily. If “public” is defined as the American population or the
world population in general, there might not be enough Internet users today to suggest that email
in cyberspace is exposed to the public, but rather a smaller branch of society. At some point in
the future, however, enough Americans and world citizens will be Internet users that using the
Internet will be considered the “public.” At that point, sending email via the Internet will be
considered exposing it to public eyes and, consequently, losing its reasonable expectation of
privacy. However, encryption technology, if it is used, would negate this analogy. But what
happens when hacker technology is able to defeat encryption technology?
The Court in Greenwood also held that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy
because the respondent had conveyed the garbage bag to a third party. 87 If a court finds this
reasoning to be applicable to an email, the question becomes: does an email sender knowingly
convey his message to a third party by using the Internet? Few Internet users are unaware of the
possibility of being hacked while online; likewise, few contemplate the ease with which this can
be accomplished. Therefore, perhaps for a few, ignorance is bliss and the Fourth Amendment
protects them, but it is unlikely any court would want to encourage ignorance. As more hacker
attacks occur and more federal software such as Carnivore comes to national attention, email
might then lose its reasonable expectation of privacy, if it every had any. Also, it could be
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argued that because an email is sent to the recipient’s email service provider’s network until the
intended recipient retrieves the message, this is conveying the email to a third party, just like
leaving garbage bags out for a trash collector to deliver to a landfill.
C.

Kyllo v. U.S. 88
1.

Facts

The petitioner was suspected of growing marijuana in his home with heat lamps. 89 From
the passenger seat of their vehicle, agents of the United States Department of Interior scanned the
petitioner’s section of a triplex from across the street with a thermal imager. 90 A thermal imager
performs much like a video camera, but it detects infrared radiation that is not visible to the
naked eye and converts the radiation into color images based on the amount of heat that is being
emitted. 91 The scan revealed part of the petitioner’s roof and one of his walls were relatively
warmer than the rest of the house and substantially warmer than the other units within the
triplex. 92 Based partly on the images from the thermal imager, a warrant authorizing the search
of the petitioner’s home was issued by a Federal Magistrate Judge. 93 As a result of the search of
the home, the petitioner was indicted for manufacturing marijuana. 94

The Supreme Court

granted certiorari to determine whether the use of a thermal imager on a home constitutes a
Fourth Amendment search. 95
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2.

Majority Opinion

The Court in Kyllo articulated a bright-line rule for this type of surveillance technology,
and for technology that will be available in the future. 96 The Court held: (1) when senseenhancing technology, (2) is used to obtain information concerning the interior of the home, (3)
which could only previously have been known by physical intrusion of an area constitutionally
protected, and (4) the technology is not in general public use, there is a search for the purposes of
the Fourth Amendment. 97 The Court held this search to be presumptively unreasonable unless
there is a warrant. 98 The Court reasoned that there is a minimum expectation of privacy in the
interior of the home and technology should not shrink that privacy. 99 It did not want the power
of technology to shrink the privacy the Fourth Amendment was originally designed to protect. 100
3.

Applying Kyllo to Email

In order for Kyllo to apply to email, all four elements will need to be met.

The

technology used to capture email must be sense-enhancing, the information obtained through the
surveillance of email must be “regarding the interior of the home,” the contents of the email must
have been previously discovered only by physical intrusion of an area constitutionally protected,
and finally the technology used must not be in “general public use.” 101 The sense-enhancing
element will likely be met because none of the five senses allow a person to capture information
traveling through an Internet connector wire and reconstruct it into a readable document. For the
second element, many emails could be considered to be “regarding the interior of the home,” but
not all.

Emails range from the most intimate details of life and home to unsolicited
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advertisements. A colorable argument can be made that emails of an intimate nature should be
considered information concerning the interior of the home. The Court in Oliver v. United
States 102 said that the area that extends to the “intimate activity of a person’s home” is a
constitutionally protected area. 103 Even though the Court in Oliver was speaking of curtilage,
the reasoning could still apply to intimate emails. Many emails will certainly be associated with
the intimate activity of a person’s home. Whether they are messages of devotion, plans for the
children, or announcing dinner time, they all relate to activities that take place within the home
and therefore deserve to remain private. But the issue of whether an email that is not “intimate”
will fall under the parameters of the Kyllo test arises. In striking down the government’s
argument that the use of a thermal imager is constitutional because it did not disclose intimate
details, the Kyllo Court said establishing a rule that allows technology to observe any details that
are not intimate would be impractical and is not a principle it would follow. 104 Therefore, even
if an email is not intimate in nature, it might still be “regarding the interior of the home” and
satisfy this element. However, to meet this factor it will likely need to be of some personal
nature or at least concern the home in some capacity and not be just an advertisement or mass
email in order to fall under Kyllo.
Even if an email meets these first two elements, the contents of the email must not be
detectable by any means other than physical intrusion without the technology. If an email
equates to a first class letter, then the contents of the email will likely only have been discovered
by physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area such as a desk or nightstand in the
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house. 105 However, as discussed above, the differences between an email and a first class letter
might not allow for such a comparison. If not a first class letter, an email will likely be equated
to some form of writing, which before could only have been discovered by some physical
intrusion. But even if an email was held to be more analogous to a telephone conversation, the
Fourth Amendment protection would still be applicable as seen in Katz. 106 Finally, the most
troubling component in applying Kyllo’s holding is the last element: the technology used cannot
be in general public use. 107 The Court never defined what is considered “general public use.”
The dissent in Kyllo even pointed out that thousands of thermal imagers were already
manufactured and anyone who wanted one could call half a dozen companies to buy one. 108 If
the Court did not consider the availability of the thermal imager to be in “general public use,”
then the fact that any Internet user could obtain a packet sniffer through thousands of websites
might not be seen as “general public use” either. But at some point in the future, email
surveillance technology, such as packet sniffers, will be so readily available or enough users will
have access to other types of technology that the final element will not be satisfied and Kyllo will
become inapplicable to email, if it is not already. Consequently, as the dissent points out, the
threat to the privacy of email will grow as technology becomes more readily available. 109 Surely
this is not the effect the Fourth Amendment was designed to have on citizens’ rights to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government, nor a precedent the Court would
wish to support.
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D.

Other Technology Cases
If or when Kyllo becomes inapplicable to the interception of email, then other Supreme

Court cases that involve technological advancements might be instructive. In California v.
Ciraolo, 110 the Court held that there was not an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in
a garden of a home from the air and, therefore, the garden could be observed by police officers
flying over in a plane. 111 The Court found that the six-foot outer fence and the ten-foot inner
fence designed to keep the defendant’s marijuana crop from street level visibility satisfied the
subjective prong of Katz. 112 However, it reasoned that any person flying in public airspace could
have observed the plants from above and, accordingly, no expectation of privacy existed even
though it was within the curtilage of the home. 113 Similarly, the Court in Florida v. Riley 114 held
that from a helicopter 400 feet above, police could observe the contents of a greenhouse through
open areas in the roof of the greenhouse. 115 Both of these cases illustrate how technology can
diminish our Fourth Amendment right to privacy.

Before the advent of the airplane and

helicopter, a person could expect that their curtilage would be free from the government’s eyes if
it was sufficiently blocked from view by a fence or greenhouse. Today, because flying is such a
common activity, one must also cover the top of his curtilage to be free from snooping eyes,
including those of the government.
These are other examples of holdings that when applied to email, will produce alarming
results. If hacking emails becomes as common an activity as flying, then the government will
likely be allowed to read anyone’s email as well. As noted earlier, it is an established principle
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that the government should not be required to avert its eyes from criminal activity that is readily
accessible to the general public.116
In Riley, however, there is a glimmer of hope for protection. In its reasoning, the Court
considered that the helicopter did not interfere with the normal use of the greenhouse or any of
the curtilage. 117 Accordingly, if the government were to employ a type of email surveillance
technology that interfered with the normal use of email, then the use of that technology might be
found to be unreasonable. The Court in Riley also noted the requirement that no intimate details
connected with the home or the curtilage be detected.118 It might then be possible if an email
with intimate details of a person’s life is observed during surveillance by the government, the
Court will rule this in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
V.

Does the ECPA Create a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?

If one cannot rely on case law to find an expectation of privacy, then it might be possible
to look to the statute designed to protect electronic communications in order to trigger Fourth
Amendment protection. In light of the changing technology in the field of communications, 119
Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986. 120 This Act extends the
reach of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act to protect against the
interception of electronic communications by the government and private actors without prior
authorization. 121 It also establishes procedures to gain lawful access to such communications by
way of surveillance. 122

Title I of the Act prohibits the interception of electronic
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communications, including email, while in transit. 123

Email and other electronic

communications that are stored find protection under Title II of the ECPA. 124 Finally, Title III
of the Act protects information associated with the addressing and routing of electronic
communications. 125
The relevant inquiry for electronic mail and Fourth Amendment purposes is whether
these protections create a reasonable expectation of privacy in email. The district court in United
States. v. Hambrick, 126 in part held, “[a]lthough Congress is willing to recognize that individuals
have some degree of privacy in the stored data and transactional records that their ISP’s retain,
the ECPA is hardly a legislative determination that this expectation of privacy is one that rises to
the level of ‘reasonably objective’ for Fourth Amendment purposes” (emphasis added). 127 Even
though the court in Hambrick was not ruling on the contents of email, but rather on personal
information given to Internet Service Providers by the subscriber, the case is still instructive. 128
The court specifically ruled that Title II of the ECPA did not give a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the stored information. 129 This is significant because Title II, as noted above, is the
same provision that covers stored email, meaning anything not in transit. Therefore, it is
plausible that all stored information does not receive Fourth Amendment protection, including
email that has reached its destination. However, the court did hold that some degree of privacy
is evidenced by the ECPA, but that this privacy was overridden by the fact that the personal
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information was given to a third party: the Internet Service Provider.130 Accordingly, the ECPA
does create a certain amount of privacy for stored email, but it is unclear whether it creates a
reasonable expectation of privacy for Fourth Amendment purposes when the email is not given
to a third party. However, it could be that every single email is given to a third party because it
is actually sent first and stored to the email service provider’s server, at least until the message is
read by the intended recipient.
Courts have not directly addressed whether the ECPA creates a reasonable expectation of
privacy in email that is in transit. If, however, the language of the ECPA is a guide, a reasonable
expectation of privacy in email that is in transit might exist because it receives more protection
than stored email under the Act. Title II requires a warrant for obtaining a stored email for up to
180 days, but after 180 days it is given less protection.131 Title I requires a warrant for any email
in transit without any time exceptions. 132 Therefore, it is possible that this seemingly small
difference in the Act signals a reasonable expectation of privacy for email in transit. In practice,
however, this would mean an email is only protected for the few milliseconds it is actually “in
transit.”
VII.

Conclusion

While the courts have yet to clearly decide the issue of whether there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy for electronic mail, the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence reasoning is
alarming when applied to email. As illustrated by Greenwood, Kyllo, Ciraolo, and Riley, as
technology increases, privacy will decrease. This will be the trend for email privacy also. If
courts follow this reasoning, then the excerpt of Justice Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead v. United
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States will become a prophesy that might be fulfilled soon. If there is no Fourth Amendment
restraint, then Congress might very well allow the government to capture email without judicial
authorization, which essentially will allow the government to reproduce papers in court that were
relied upon as secret. Some argue the Patriot Act already allows this.
This is not the spirit of the Fourth Amendment, the intended interpretation of the
Amendment by the Court, or the desire of the people. Because the Court has made it clear that
the Fourth Amendment protects people and not just areas, 133 this should be the guiding principle
in articulating a rule for the privacy of email, rather than the advancement of technology, which
continues to shrink privacy. If someday email is regularly intercepted by private actors, the
government should continue to respect society’s privacy in communication and not be allowed to
intercept email as well, at least without first obtaining a warrant supported by probable cause.
Law enforcement should not be forced to divert its eyes from criminal activity that is open to the
public, but the key words to that well established principle is criminal activity – not everyone’s
email relates to criminal activity. Accordingly, a warrant should always be required before a
person’s email can be intercepted. An unambiguous rule needs to be set forth to articulate what
seems to be the vast majority of email users’ belief: that there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy in email and, therefore, there is constitutional protection against unreasonable search and
seizure.
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